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Abstract: Studies often conclude that in SADC would be disastrous and not optimal for all member 
countries. This is because of the observed low, and even negative correlation amongst member 
countries. However, Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrate that the degree of synchronisation is not 
irrevocably fixed and is endogenous to other factors. Hence, this study is set out to investigate factors 
influencing business cycle synchronisation in the SADC region. More precisely, we use a generalised 
method of moments (GMM) to investigate the influence of trade integration, financial integration, fiscal 
policy convergence, monetary policy similarity and oil prices (a proxy for global common shocks) on 
the degree of business cycle synchronisation. To conduct our analysis, we data covering the period of 
1980-2014, we use bilateral data due to unavailability of regional aggragates. We find trade, fiscal 
policy convergence and monetary policy similarity to have a sanguine impact on the degree of 
synchronisation. Moreover, owing to their procyclical behavior, financial flows lead to diverging 
business cycles. In addition, we find oil prices to exert a negative impact on business cycle comovement 
in the SADC region. Our results have far-reaching policy implications for the proposed SADC 
monetary union- by stimulating trade, ensuring coherence in macroeconomic policies SADC could 
move closer to becoming an optimal currency area. 
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1. Introduction 
Region-wide fixed exchange rate regime, or monetary union entails a loss monetary 
policy tools to deal with economic disturbances at a country-level. Therefore, for 
countries whose business cycles are significantly driven by idiosyncratic factors, 
using a common monetary policy or establishing a monetary union will be costly and 
not optimal for all member countries. Hence, to alleviate costs associated with the 
loss of monetary policy tools, the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), amongst 
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other things, put business cycle synchronicity as a necessary requirement. As a 
consequence, in a monetary union environment business cycle synchronisation has 
been extensively studied. In addition, business cycle synchronicity has been applied 
as an instrument to gauge the suitability of a monetary union in the Euro Area, East 
Asia, Eastern and Western parts of Africa, and most importantly, in Southern Africa.  
Relying on historical data, enormous amount of studies suggests that adoption of a 
common monetary policy in SADC would disastrous, and would lead to 
macroeconomic instabilities across the region. This is because historical data 
uncover insufficient degree of business cycle comovement in SADC, and alternative 
adjustment mechanisms suggested by the OCA such as labour mobility, nominal 
flexibilities are absent.  
Drawing from the famous Lucas critique, Frankel & Rose (1998) critique the view 
that business cycle synchronization is a precondition for adopting a common 
monetary policy. They argue that historical data may be misleading and business 
cycle synchronicity is not irrevocably fixed, and is not exogenous. If this thesis 
holds, business cycle synchronisation could be an ex post rather than an ex ante 
phenomena. This notion is owing to the view that introducing a single currency 
reduces transaction costs, and exchange rate uncertainty and therefore, stimulate 
trade which in turn reinforces business cycle comovement (Gouveia & Correia, 
2013). Consistent with this view, Rose (2000) demonstrate that countries sharing a 
single currency tend to trade more with each other, and are more synchronized vis-
à-vis countries not sharing the same currency. Likewise, Barro & Tenreyro (2007) 
reveals that adopting a single currency tend to fuel trade. Moreover, Rose & Van 
Wincoop (2001) argue that indeed, using a single currency tend to boost trade; 
therefore, international currencies (multiple currencies) appear to be a significant 
impediment for trade.  
As mentioned earlier, that the literature on the degree of business cycle 
synchronisation in SADC often concludes that based on weaker business cycle 
alignment common monetary policy in SADC would not be optimal1. However, 
neither of these studies attempts to uncover factors which could explain the 
underlying levels of synchronisation, nor they suggest solutions to the observed low 
levels of synchronisation. Therefore, in this study we set out to investigate factors 
influencing business cycle comovement in SADC. Identification of factors 
explaining comovement in SADC is essential for a number of reasons. Firstly, it 
equip policy makers with crucial knowledge to develop structural policies that will 
improve efficiency, and allow the application of a common monetary policy. 
Secondly, if business cycles are driven by peripheral factors such as trade, internal 
policies intended to stabilize the economy would have negligible impact on output 
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growth, thus necessitating for economic policy coordination. Therefore, deeper 
knowledge about factors through which business cycles are transmitted is warranted, 
and has far-reaching policy implications. Moreover, knowledge of the factors 
influencing business cycle comovement would assist SADC monetary union 
aspirants trying to determine the best timing to adopt a single currency, and whether 
such move would fast-track their convergence process (Vieira & Vieira, 2012). 
This paper is organize as follows. The next section reviews the literature on factors 
explaining business cycle comovement. Section 3 describes data and empirical 
framework applied to conduct the analysis. Results and discussion are presented in 
section 4, whereas final section concludes and identifies scope for further research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Why some countries are synchronized, and others are not? What could possible 
explain the observed low levels of business cycle synchronisation in SADC? The 
ability to answer these questions will contribute toward the development of structural 
policies that mitigate the adverse impact associated with the use of a single monetary 
policy. This section therefore, concisely reviews literature on the determinants of 
business cycle comovement.  
A number of potential determinants of business cycle synchronisation, such as trade, 
currency union membership and industrial similarity, amongst others, have been 
identified1. However, industrial similarity and currency union membership are 
generally found not to be robust estimators of synchronisation, thus they are 
excluded from our analysis (Furceri & Karras, 2008; De Haan et al., 2008; Clark & 
Van Wincoop, 2001; Cerqueira & martins, 2009; Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2005 
amongst others). In addition, required data to compute industrial similarity is hardly 
available in SADC, therefore, one extra reasons not exclude it from our analysis.  
Trade is argued to play an integral role in explaining business cycle similarity; it 
ensures quick propagation of shocks across countries (Frankel & Rose, 1998; Faia, 
2007; Gouveia & Correia, 2013; Barro & Tenreyro, 2007, amongst others). 
However, both empirical theoretical models and empirical evidence suggests an 
ambiguous link between trade and business cycle synchronicity.  
There is a belief that trade intensification could results to asynchronous business 
cycles. Classical models of trade demonstrates that intensification of trade would 
result to specialisation as countries attempt to exploit comparative advantage 
(Krugman, 1993; Kenen, 1969). Since countries are specialized sector specific 
shocks will be translated to country-specific shocks, thus resulting to diverging 
                                                     
1 See (Artis & Zhang, 1999). 
ŒCONOMICA 
 303 
business cycles. Consistent with this prediction, Crosby (2003) find that trade have 
adverse impact on business cycle synchronicity in Asia-Pacific countries.  
On one hand, Backus et al., (1993) argue that trade will result to strengthened 
business cycle comovement. A shock hitting a particular economy will be 
transmitted, through demand linkages, to its trading partners. Hence, countries which 
trade more with each other tend to be more synchronized that countries that trade 
less with each other (Di Giovanni & Levchenko, 2010). In line with this view, 
Frankel & Rose (1998) find that trade has a sanguine impact on business cycle 
synchronisation. In addition, they conclude that the theory of OCA is not exogenous, 
and business cycle synchronisation should not deter countries from establishing a 
monetary union. This is because, establishing a monetary union would result to a 
reduction in transaction costs etc. thus stimulating trade. Rose & Angel (2000) 
accord with this view, they demonstrate that countries using in a currency union tend 
to trade more with each other, than countries which are not in a union. There is a 
large strand of the literature showing a positive relationship between trade, and 
business cycle comovement, (Clark & Van Wincoop, 2001; Furceri & Karras, 2008, 
amongst others). 
Contrast to both views about the impact of trade on business cycle synchronisation, 
Otto et al., (2001) questions the importance of trade in explaining business cycle 
comovement. They argue that Australia trades more with Japan than with United 
States; yet, it business cycle is strongly correlated with that of United States vis-à-
vis Japanese business cycle. This is consistent with Dellas (1986) he demonstrate 
that trade linkages plays little role in explaining business cycle comovement, and he 
argues that interdependencies are rather explained by common shocks.  
The other channel which in the literature is argued to have positive impact on 
business cycle comovement is monetary policy1. Although number of studies found 
monetary policy similarity to have positive impact on business cycle synchronicity; 
its impact on business cycles is still unsettled. Otto et al., (2001) find that great 
volatility in interest rate differential has a negative impact on business cycle 
synchronicity. Whereas, Clark and Van Wincoop (1999) find that monetary policy 
similarity has no significant impact on business cycle comovement. Schiavo (2008) 
find that monetary policy similarity has an indirect impact on business cycle 
comovement. Thus, the endogeneity of business cycle synchronisation does not 
suggest that by joining a monetary union countries will become more synchronized, 
but rather, the prospective increase in trade and financial linkages induced by the use 
of a common currency will have a positive influence on business cycle comovement.  
Following the establishment of the European Union, the impact of financial 
integration received enormous interest from both scholars, and policy makers around 
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the globe. However, regarding financial integration Southern Africa has been 
neglected as an area of study. Financial integration is expected to promptly increase 
in Southern Africa due to the envisaged economic integration, and the proposed 
introduction of Southern Africa single currency in 2018. Hence, understanding 
economic consequences of deeper financial integration is warranted. 
Given that country-specific shocks can no longer be dealt with by maneuvering 
monetary policy tools, since monetary policy tools are dedicated to addressing union 
wide disturbances. Given the lack of independent monetary policy response, 
asymmetric disturbances may induce welfare loses, and threatens the stability of a 
monetary union, unless, risk sharing mechanisms are in place, and one of the 
mechanism through which risk are shared is financial integration.  
Financial integration is integral for the functioning of a monetary union because it 
allows agents to exploit “risk sharing” mechanisms thus resulting to synchronisation 
of business cycles (Cerqueira & martins, 2009). For example, Balli et al., (2011) 
argue that monetary policy in a monetary union may fail to deal with asymmetric 
disturbances, so financial integration permit consumers to borrow from countries 
experiencing booms, and therefore synchronizing cycles. Kose et al., (2003) also 
argue that stronger financial linkages could reinforce business cycle synchronisation 
through demand linkages. Similar conclusions are reached by Imbs (2001; 2006). 
Consistent with these studies, Jansen and Stockman (2004) demonstrate that 
financial integration results to stronger business cycle comovement across countries. 
Moreover, Kose et al., (2008a; 2008b) show that financial linkages stimulate 
business cycle synchronisation.  
On the other hand risk sharing encourages industrial specialisation, thus resulting to 
asymmetric shocks which in turn result to asynchronous business cycle. This has 
been demonstrated, amongst others, by Kalemli-Ozcan (2003) and Obstfeld (1994). 
Moreover, Backus et al., (1992) argue that the behavior of financial flows is 
procyclical. For example, assume that there two countries in the world, X and Y, and 
X experiences a positive technological shocks; agents will pull their capital from 
country Y to country X where marginal product of capital and labour has increased. 
Therefore, the procyclicality behavior of financial flows will results to diverging 
business cycles. In line with these studies Garcia-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) show that 
intensified financial integration leads to asymmetric business cycles. Heathcote and 
Perri (2004) reach similar conclusions that financial integration leads to diverging 
business cycles.  
Fiscal policy discipline or convergence is identified as another important channel 
through which business cycles are synchronized. However, a plethora of economists 
treat fiscal policy convergence with cynicism, because it has little or nothing to do 
with the traditional theory of optimal currency areas. In addition, there is no existing 
theory linking fiscal policy convergence with business cycle comovements (Darvas 
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et al., 2005). Despite the lack of theoretical connection between business cycle 
comovement and fiscal policy convergence, it is relatively easier to build an 
instinctive link between the two. Countries which are ill-disciplined in their fiscal 
policy conduct i.e. countries that run high budget deficits, generate individual fiscal 
policy shocks thus resulting to diverging business cycles. Thus, in envisaged, and or 
already established unions, fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical as opposed to 
procyclical (Gavin & Perrott, 1997; Brender & Drazen, 2004). Simply put, in the 
absence of idiosyncratic shocks which would otherwise lead to divergent business 
cycles, the use of fiscal policy would be irresponsible. Consistent with this, Fatás 
and Mihov (2003) argue that aggressive use of fiscal policy is associated with 
macroeconomic instabilities, and impede economic growth. Similarly, Badinger 
(2009) show that discretional use of fiscal policy results to significant and ample 
output volatility. Rodden and Wibbels (2010) accord with the view that fiscal policy 
should rather be counter-cyclical. In addition, fiscal policy in a monetary union 
should be centralized, and centralized fiscal policy provides insurance (in terms of 
fiscal transfers) against adverse shocks hitting a particular economy in a union1. 
Furthermore, Fatás and Mihov (2003) argue that fiscal policy restrictions would 
lower macroeconomic volatilities. However, on the other hand fiscal policy 
restrictions are argued to limit fiscal policy action when it is needed the most (i.e. in 
the presence of shocks which would otherwise lead to diverging business cycles). In 
addition, fiscal policy restrictions may exacerbate economic fluctuations since they 
disregard cyclical conditions (Levinson, 1998). For example, in the case of Europe 
they argue that rules will worsen recessions, since countries will be tempted to apply 
procyclical fiscal policy when cyclical downturns increase deficits towards the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) cap (Lane, 2003 and Alt and Lowry, 1994). 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1. Econometric Framework 
Longitudinal data methods have become increasingly popular in the past few decades 
and are now the most used tools in contemporary econometrics, both in 
microeconomics and macroeconomics (Hsiao, 2005). The increasing popularity of 
panel data techniques is owing to a number of factors, predominantly because they 
allow practitioners to exploit two dimensions of the data: a cross-sectional dimension 
and a time series dimension (Hsiao, 2005).  
Consider the following simple linear dynamic panel model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                    (1) 
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𝜖𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                 (2) 
Where 𝑖 = 1,2…… ,𝑁, 𝑡 = 1,2…… , 𝑇, 𝑋′ is a (1 × 𝐾) vector of regressors,  𝛽 is a 
(𝐾 × 1) vector of coefficients to be estimated, 𝜇𝑖 represents an individual fixed 
effects, capturing individual differences, and𝜀𝑖𝑡 denote individual error term. We 
assume 𝜇𝑖and 𝜀𝑖𝑡to be i. i. d. with (0, 𝜎
2). Moreover, we assume that are exogenous 
to each other. Therefore, 
𝐸[𝜔𝑖𝑡] = [𝜏𝑖𝑡] = [𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝜏𝑖𝑡] = 0                                   (3) 
The introduction of the lagged endogenous variable introduces a dynamic panel bias 
because 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 are correlated. Because 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a function of 𝜇𝑖 which is time-
invariant, it must also be true that 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is a function of 𝜇𝑖. Therefore, one of the 
regressors is correlated with one component of the error term, thus giving rise to the 
problem of endogeneity.  
Hence, application of the ordinary least squares (OLS) in equation (1) will yield 
inconsistent and upward biased estimates, because 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, 𝜖𝑖𝑡] > 0, therefore, 𝛽1 
will be overestimated (Blundell & Bond, 2000). To tackle endogeneity bias the 
literature suggests two remedies which could be applied simultaneously or 
successively. First, one can eliminate time-invariant effect by through data 
transformation such as first differencing. Secondly, by searching for valid 
instruments of the lagged endogenous variable (Mairesse & Hall, 1996). 
For simplicity we reduce equation one to only include one explanatory variable, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                                  (4) 
To remove the time-invariant component of the error term which is correlated with 
the explanatory variable, equation (4) is subtracted from equation (3); 
𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽1𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡−1                                       (5) 
Resulting to equation (5) 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (6) 
Where ∆= (1 − 𝐿) is a first difference operator. In other words, we get the 
transformation by multiplying equation (2) by 𝐼𝑁⨂𝐷, where 𝐼𝑁 is an identity matrix 
of dimension 𝑁 snd 𝐷 is a 𝑇 − 1) × 𝑇 matrix1; 
(
−1 1 0 … 0 0
0 −1 1 … 0 0
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
0 0 0 0 −1 0
)                             (7) 
                                                     
1 See Arellano (2003) for more discussion. 
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Although first differencing (𝑇 − 1) takes care of the individual time-invariant effect, 
its results to the loss of the degrees of freedom, since its drops 𝑇 initial observations 
which could have severe ramification for an unbalanced panel (Griliches & 
Mairesse, 1998). The transformation, the first difference estimator is the OLS 
estimator of the equation (6) that is 
?̂? = {∑(𝐷𝑋𝑖)
′𝐷𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
}
−1
∑(𝐷𝑋𝑖)′𝐷𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
              (8) 
Owing to the assumption that 𝜏𝑖𝑡~i. i. d. (0, σ𝜏
2), the first difference estimator is 
inconsistent since the transformation (i.e. the first differencing) prompts a 𝑀𝐴(1) 
process for the ∆𝜏𝑖𝑡. This issue calls for a generalised least squares (GLS) (see, 
Arellano, 2003). Moreover, as shown in Arellano (2003) the optimal GLS estimator 
is the within-Group estimator which takes the following form; 
?̂?𝑊𝐺 = (∑𝑋𝑖
′𝐷′(𝐷𝐷′)−1𝐷𝑋𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
−1
(∑𝑋𝑖
′𝐷′(𝐷𝐷′)−1𝐷𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)      (9) 
In line with Arellano (2003) 𝑄 matrix is defined as the “deviations-from-time-
means” because it alters 𝑦𝑖𝑡 series into deviations from time averages 𝑦?̅? = 𝑄𝑦𝑖, 
whose elements are ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖. 𝑄 Matrix is shown to be: 
𝑄 ≡ 𝐷′(𝐷𝐷′)−1𝐷                                            (10) 
 Again, the within group estimator successfully get rid of the individual fixed effect, 
however, it fails to fix the dynamic panel bias. Therefore, yields inconsistent 
estimates (Nickell, 1981). 
Given their failure, pooled OLS, the first difference estimator and within group 
estimator, to resolve the issue of dynamic panel bias, an alternative tool to deal with 
the challenge is warranted.  
Instrumental variable estimators are amongst alternative models used to deal with 
the issue of dynamic panel bias (Anderson & Hsiao, 1981; 1982 amongst others). 
The instrumental variable approach is usually preferred over the maximum 
likelihood of Hsiao (2003), on the grounds that maximum likelihood (ML) requires 
that assumptions about initial conditions be made, and that they must be correctly 
specified, otherwise, ML estimator would be inconsistent. Although the estimators 
of Anderson and Hsiao successfully identify the model, they are not necessarily 
efficient because they do not exploit all instruments available1.  
                                                     
1 See for a lengthy discussion. 
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The panel data generalised method of moments1 (GMM) circumvent most, if not all 
issues faced by other estimators. Through exploitation of a set of meaningful set of 
instruments, for each instrument, GMM permits the use of all available instruments. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the use of all available lags each period in time 
as instruments for first-differenced lagged endogenous variable in equation (5)2.  The 
Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator is known as the difference GMM estimator. The 
Arellano &Bond (1991) first difference estimator is given by: 
?̂?𝐺𝑀𝑀 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = ((∆y−1
′ Zd )𝑊𝑁(𝑍𝑑
′ ∆𝑦−1)
−1(∆𝑦−1𝑍𝑑)𝑊𝑁(𝑍𝑑
′ ∆𝑦)              (11) 
Where ∆𝑦𝑖 = (∆𝑦𝑖3, ∆𝑦𝑖4, … , ∆𝑦𝑖𝑇)′, ∆𝑦−1  is  vector which includes the first lag of 
∆𝑦𝑖,  𝑍
′∆𝑦 = ∑ 𝑍𝑑𝑖,
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖, 𝑊𝑁 is an optimal weighting matrix and 𝑍𝑑 is an 
instrument matrix for 𝑖𝑡ℎindividual which has 𝑇 − 2 rows with non-negative element 
and (𝑇 − 2)(𝑇 − 1)/2 columns. The difference GMM estimator of Arellano & Bond 
(1991) is consistent for 𝑇 → ∞ , 𝑁 → ∞ and also for fixed 𝑇.  
Although, the first difference GMM estimator performs better than other panel 
techniques3, it is however not without hitches. More precisely, when the lags of 
dependent variable are weakly correlated with dependent first differences in the 
following period, first difference GMM (FDGMM) is argued to suffer from finite 
sample bias (Blundell & Bond, 1998).  
The drawbacks of the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator gave birth to the systems 
GMM of Blundell & Bond (1998). The systems GMM formulate supplementary 
orthogonality conditions that make more valid instruments accessible and efficiency 
gains. In addition to the use of lagged levels of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as instruments for the first 
differences equations, system GMM estimator (SGMM) uses the lagged first-
difference ∆𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 of 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as instruments for equation (1) in levels. Therefore, the 
resulting SGMM estimator is given: 
?̂?𝑖𝐺𝑀𝑀 𝑠 = (𝑞−1
′ 𝑍𝑠𝑊𝑁𝑍𝑠′𝑞−1)
−1
(𝑞−1
′ 𝑍𝑠𝑊𝑁𝑍𝑠𝑞𝑖)                    (12) 
Where 𝑞𝑖 = (∆𝑦𝑖
′, 𝑦𝑖
′) and 𝑍𝑠 is full instrument matrix. The SGMM is proved to be 
more efficient relative to FDGMM estimator, especially as 𝛽 → 1.  
In light of the issues associated with dynamic panel data and other dynamic panel 
data estimators such as FD and the within group, this study employs systems GMM 
to estimate factors influencing business cycle comovement in SADC. A plethora of 
studies have used similar equation to estimate factors influencing business cycle 
synchronisation and thus variables employed in the study are adopted from various 
                                                     
1 Initially developed by Hansen (1982); Hansen and Singleton (1982).  
2 Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988) also suggest the same thing.  
3 See (Bond, Hoeffler & Temple, 2001; Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
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studies (Lee & Azali, 2010; Cerqueira & Martins, 2009; Clark & Wincoop, 2001; 
Darvas et al., 2005 amongst others). 
𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑡,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑘,𝑡     (13) 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡,𝑡 is business cycle correlation index between country 𝑖 and 𝑘, 𝑇𝐼𝑖𝑘,𝑡 
denotes trade intensity, 𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is the degree of financial integration, 𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡 represents 
fiscal policy convergence, 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is monetary policy similarity, 𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is are oil 
prices which represent exogenous common shocks, and 𝑒𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is the error term.  
3.2. Data Sources 
We use a panel data covering the period of 1980-2014 which is collected from 
various sources. Nominal oil prices are collected from IMF world economic 
indicators, and converted into real oil prices using world GDP deflator collected from 
IMF world economic indicators database. Data on financial flows, inflation rates, 
and government deficit/surplus were collected from World Development Indicators, 
and data on bilateral trade is collected from CEPPII database.  
3.3. Construction of Variables 
Real Oil Prices: in line with existing studies, we use real oil prices as measure for 
global exogenous shocks1. 
Business cycle synchronisation index: 
To construct business cycle index we follow Kalemli-Ozcan (2009) and Gionnone 
et al., (2009), they construct the index of business cycle comovement as negative 
absolute differences in real GDP between country 𝑖 and 𝑗. Thus, we have a total 
of 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)/2, bilateral correlations.  
𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 = −|(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)
− (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡−1)|                                              (14) 
Fiscal Policy Convergence: 
𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡
= |
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
−
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
|                                                                                        (15) 
                                                     
1 See (Moneta & Ruffer, 2009; Kutu & Ngalawa, 2016, amongst others) 
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To measure fiscal policy convergence, we follow Darvas et al., (2005), they measure 
convergence as absolute differences in government budget deficit/surplus between 
the two countries in question as a share of GDP.  
Monetary Policy Similarity: 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡
= |𝜋𝑖𝑡
− 𝜋𝑗𝑡|                                                                                                                           (16) 
Monetary policy similarity is measured as absolute differences in inflation rate 
between country 𝑖 and 𝑗.  
Financial Integration: 
 De facto financial Integration:  
𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑘𝑡
= [(
𝐶𝐹𝑗𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
)
+ (
𝐶𝐹𝑘𝑡
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑘𝑡
)]                                                                                                        (18) 
De facto financial integration is measured as a sum of financial flows (outflows and 
inflows) between the countries of interest weighted by the sum of their GDP’s.  
Trade Integration: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
=
∑((𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡) + (𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 +𝑀𝑗𝑖𝑡))
∑(𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑗𝑡)
                                                                     (18) 
Trade intensity is measured as a sum of exports and imports between the two 
countries in consideration weighted by the sum of their GDP’s. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
To address potential problems of endogeneity, we employ the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) generalized method of moments. This section therefore presents result from 
GMM regressions.  
In line with Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and Van Wincoop (2001), Imbs (2006) 
and Cerqueira and Martins (2009) our results suggest that trade countries with 
greater bilateral trade relations tend to have greater synchronisation of their business 
cycles. This implies that removal of trade restrictions will result to higher degree of 
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synchronisation since increased levels of trade will permit easy transmission of 
demand shocks across countries. Contrast to Kose et al., (2003) who find that the 
positive link between trade and business cycle comovement is limited only to 
industrial countries, we demonstrate that the relationship holds even in developing 
countries1.  
Table 1. Systems GMM: Factors Influencing Business Cycle Synchronisation 
 
  
Lagged Dependent Var. 
0.367*** 
 
0.324*** 
 
0.381*** 
0.377*** 0.341*** 
  
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.027)   
Trade intensity 
 
0.224*** 
 
0.219*** 
 
0.160*** 
 0.102*  0.079** 
  
 (0.032) (0.348) (0.056) (0.053) (0.0 63)   
De facto financial 
integration  
-
0.383*** 
-
0.291*** 
-
0.668*** 
-
0.753*** 
  
  (0.058) (0.071) (0.135) (0.098)   
Mon. pol. Similarity   
 0.016 
 
0.049***  0.055** 
  
   (0.023) (0.016) (0.023)   
Fisc. pol convergence    
 
0.624*** 
 0.455** 
  
    (0.145) (0.185)   
Oil Prices     
-
0,506*** 
  
          (0.212)   
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) 
-4.98 -4.38 -4.15 -4.32 -4.24 
  
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
1.26 1.38 1.56 1.88 1.60 
  
 [0.206] [0.168] [0.118] [0.601] [0.109]   
Hansen Test  65.83 59.98 54.95 56.54 54.76   
  [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]   
*, **, *** represents 1%, 5% & 10% levels of significance   
In round brackets are standard errors, and in square brackets are p-values for corresponding 
tests 
  
Our findings imply that SADC must strive to strengthen trade ties amongst member 
countries. Indeed, initiatives to reinforce trade relations in SADC are place. For 
example, SADC free trade area was established in 2000. However, countries like 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles are not part of the free trade area. If 
countries which remain outside the free trade area could join, the scope of intra-
SADC trade could be expanded and thus reinforcing business cycle comovement.  
                                                     
1 See also (Calderon et al., 2007). 
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In addition, our results have far reaching implications for the proposed SADC 
monetary union. As argued by Frankel and Rose (1998) and Shin and Wang (2003) 
if trade exerts positive influence on business cycle comovement, then even if a 
country that is not suitable ex ante  to join a monetary union, it can be justified ex 
post due to the resulting business cycle coherence.  
Contrary to Imbs (2004) and Kose et al., (2003) who find that financial integrated 
countries tend to be highly synchronized. Our findings suggest that financial 
integration results to diverging business cycles in SADC. This is in line with the 
predictions of risk sharing theory, which suggests that financial integration results to 
higher production specialisation; and therefore, induce industry-specific shocks 
which translates to country-specific shocks thus asymmetric business cycles1 (In 
addition, we argue that the behavior of financial flow is procyclical, such that agents 
tend to pull their investment from countries experiencing downturns, to countries 
experiencing booms. Simply put, better performing economies tend to attract more 
financial inflows; therefore, resulting to decoupling business cycles (Backus et al., 
1992). 
Contrary to Moneta and Ruffer (2009) we find that real oil prices have a decoupling 
effect on business cycles across the region. Simply put, our findings suggest that oil 
prices shocks lead to asynchronous business cycles. We argue that the 
desynchronizing effect of oil prices can be attributed to the fact that some countries 
in the SADC region are net oil exporters, and others are net oil importers. Real oil 
price shocks have different impact on business cycles across countries, depending 
on whether a country is a net oil exporter, or net oil importer. Indeed, studies 
examining the relationship between oil prices, and economic activity suggests that 
the response differs depending on whether a country imports or exports oil2. In 
addition, based on this finding, we argue that the view that global common shocks 
results to symmetric business cycle may not necessarily be the case. Common shocks 
will have coupling impact, if and only if, economies share a common economic 
structures.  
Our findings suggest that monetary policy similarity has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on business cycle comovement. Our results are consistent with 
existing literature (see Frankel and Rose, 1998 and Otto et al., 2001 amongst others). 
These findings have far reaching policy implications for SADC region. They suggest 
that monetary policy coordination  
Although there are no established theoretical linkages between business cycle 
comovement, and fiscal convergence, empirical studies have suggested a positive 
link between the two variables (Artis et al., 2008). Indeed, our results suggest that 
                                                     
1 See (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2001; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2004; Cerqueira & Martins, 2009). 
2 See (Jimenez-Rodriguez & Sanchez, 2005; Nzimande & Msomi, 2016; Hamilton, 1983; Cunado & 
de Gracia, 2005; Lardic & Mignon, 2008). 
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there is a positive association between fiscal policy convergence and business cycle 
synchronisation in SADC. These findings are consistent with those of Darvas et al., 
(2005) and Artis et al., (2008). This finding is in line with the view that in a monetary 
union fiscal policy must be countercyclical, rather than being ‘procyclical’ (see Fatás 
and Mihov, 2004). In addition, Carmignani and Laurenceson (2013) argue that 
coordination of fiscal policies could result to synchronized business cycles. 
Therefore, we suggest that fiscal policy restrictions be imposed across SADC 
member countries, and policies must be coordinated. Overall, our findings show that 
the SADC convergence criteria should give rise to further coupling effect because of 
convergent fiscal policies (Anoruo & Ahmad, 2013). 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We assessed the relationship between trade intensity, financial integration, fiscal 
policy convergence, monetary policy similarity, oil prices and business cycle 
synchronisation in SADC member countries, over the period of 1994-2014. In line 
with Frankel and Rose (1998) we confirm that business cycle comovement is 
endogenous, and thus the observed lower levels of synchronisation in SADC are not 
irrevocably fixed. Contrast to Krugman (1993) we find that intensifying trade results 
to more synchronous business cycles. In addition, all other variables, with exception 
of oil prices, and financial integration have positive impact on business cycle 
synchronisation.  The adverse effect of financial integration on business cycles is in 
line with the predictions of ‘risk sharing’ theory. The risk sharing theory suggests 
that financial integration will induce industrial specialisation across the regions or 
countries and thus leading to asymmetric shocks- thus decoupling business cycle. 
Furthermore, the negative influence of financial integration on business cycle 
synchronisation could be explained by the procyclical behavior of financial 
movements. With regards to oil prices, we argue that their decoupling effect could 
be explained by the fact that some countries in the region are net oil exporters while 
others are net oil importers; thus oil price shocks have different impact- depending 
on whether a country is a net importer, or exporter of oil. Furthermore, we show that 
fiscal policy convergence and monetary policy similarity have a business impact on 
business cycle comovement. Thus, the SADC convergence criteria should give rise 
to increased synchronisation due to convergent fiscal policies, and similar monetary 
policies.  
Overall, we conclude that indeed business cycle synchronisation is not irrevocably 
fixed, and is endogenous (De Grauwe and Mongelli, 2005). Thus, consistent with 
Flandreau and Maurel (2005) we recommend a fast establishment of SADC 
monetary union relatively independent of the attained degree of business cycle 
synchronicity. In addition, number of studies have shown that monetary union could 
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be established even if countries are not synchronized ex ante they can get more 
synchronized ex post1.   
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